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COMMENTARY / VIEWPOINTS

I. The Deductibility of a Buyout Payment

II. The Employee’s Tax Liability
There are important differences in the tax treatment of
itemized and nonitemized deductions. Itemized deductions are subject to limitations that do not apply to
nonitemized deductions. As noted above, miscellaneous

5
Steger v. Commissioner, 113 T.C. 227, 231, Doc 1999-31994,
1999 TNT 191-58. The fee will not be treated as a nondeductible
capital expenditure of the employee even though it is incurred
to permit the employee to qualify to take a new position. Reg.
section 1.263(a)-4(e)(1)(ii) expressly provides that the ‘‘amount
paid to terminate (or facilitate the termination of) an existing
agreement does not facilitate the acquisition or creation of
another agreement . . . .’’ See Rev. Rul. 2000-7, 2000-1 C.B. 712,
Doc 2000-3874, 2000 TNT 27-22 (the cost of removing existing
telephone poles to replace them with new poles is a deductible
expense). The authors are indebted to Prof. Gregg Polsky for
alerting us to this point.
6
Sections 62(a)(1) and 67(b); reg. section 1.62-1T(e)(3).
7
While the overall limitation of section 68 is being phased
out, it is scheduled to return in full force for years beginning
after 2010. Section 68(f) and (g), and the Economic Growth and
Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, P.L. 107-16, section 901(a).
8
Section 56(b)(1)(A)(I).
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itemized deductions are subjected to especially rigorous
limitations. On the other hand, a nonitemized deduction
is fully deductible and is not subject to any of those
limitations.9
Under the Old Colony doctrine, one person’s payment
of the tax liability of a second person is treated as if the
second person had paid the tax and then was reimbursed
by the first person.10 So, regardless of whether the
University of Michigan were to pay West Virginia the $2.5
million or reimburse Rodriguez for paying it, the transaction will be treated for tax purposes as if Rodriguez
himself had paid it, and then was reimbursed by Michigan. In the usual case in which an employer pays an
employee’s liability, the employee will recognize gross
income in that amount; and that was what occurred in
Old Colony. Nevertheless, there are two independent
reasons why the payment of part of the coach’s buyout
obligation by the University of Michigan will not cause
him to incur tax liability.

A. Nonitemized Deduction
As previously noted, if Rodriguez’s actual or constructive payment of the $2.5 million that will be paid by
Michigan is treated as a nonitemized deduction, it will be
fully deductible and will therefore wash out the inclusion
of the reimbursement of that amount in the coach’s
income. Most of the nonitemized deductions are listed in
section 62(a). Section 62(a)(2)(A) treats an employee
business expense as a nonitemized deduction if it is
incurred in connection with the employee’s services
under a reimbursement or other expense allowance arrangement. The question is whether the actual or constructive reimbursement by the University of Michigan
falls within that provision. The problem is that the
services were for the prior employer (West Virginia)
rather than to the new employer (Michigan). Can the
payment qualify for nonitemization treatment in that
circumstance?
Why should a reimbursed employee business expense
be treated so much more favorably than an unreimbursed
employee business expense? There are good reasons to
criticize the code’s different treatment,11 but that is what
Congress has chosen. The apparent rationale for making
this distinction is that an employer’s reimbursement
provides third-party verification that the expenditure

9
For a discussion of the classification of deductions as
itemized or nonitemized and a criticism of that system, see
Jeffrey Kahn, ‘‘Beyond the Little Dutch Boy: An Argument for
Structural Change in Tax Deduction Classification,’’ 80 Wash. L.
Rev. 1 (2005).
10
The landmark Supreme Court case that promulgated that
doctrine is Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716
(1929). The treatment of a direct payment by an employer as a
reimbursement of a payment constructively made by the employee is reflected in reg. sections 1.62-2(d)(1) and 1.162-17(b)(1).
11
One of the authors has criticized the code’s harsher treatment of unreimbursed employee business expenses in two
articles. See Kahn, ‘‘Beyond the Little Dutch Boy,’’ supra note 9,
at 20-25, 62-63; Jeffrey Kahn, ‘‘The Mirage of Equivalence and
the Ethereal Principles of Parallelism and Horizontal Equity,’’ 57
Hastings L.J. 645, 677-679 (2006).
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Before considering the tax consequences of the payment made by the new employer, it is necessary to
determine whether an unreimbursed payment by an
employee to be released from an employment contract is
a deductible expense under section 162. If the payment is
fully deductible by the employee, it does not matter
whether the new employer’s payment of the buyout
amount (or reimbursement of the employee for paying it)
will be income to the employee. Even if the new employer’s payment is income to the employee, the income
is washed out by allowing a full deduction for the actual
or constructive payment deemed made to the old employer.
‘‘It has long been established that the cost of dissolution and termination of a business constitutes ‘an everyday happening in the business world,’’’ and so
‘‘constitutes an ordinary and necessary . . . expense’’ that
is deductible as a business expense if ‘‘directly connected
with, or . . . proximately resulted from the taxpayer’s
business.’’5 A coach’s employment is the coach’s business, and so the cost of terminating that employment is a
deductible business expense. However, an unreimbursed
employee business expense is characterized as a miscellaneous itemized deduction.6
The problem with that characterization is that a miscellaneous itemized deduction is not fully deductible.
The amount of those deductions is limited by sections 67
and 68.7 Moreover, miscellaneous itemized deductions
are not deductible at all for purposes of the alternative
minimum tax.8 Because of the large amounts Rodriguez
will be paying to West Virginia, it is probable that the
AMT will apply; if so, he will get little or no deduction
for the $1.5 million he will pay to West Virginia.
The proper treatment of the $2.5 million that the
University of Michigan will pay is another matter, and
additional considerations apply.
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This requirement is generally satisfied if, under all
the facts and circumstances, the employer derives a
substantial business benefit from the provision of
the property or services that is distinct from the
benefit that it would derive from the mere payment
of additional compensation, and the employee’s
hypothetical payment for the property or services
would otherwise be allowable as a deduction by the
employee under section 162 of the Code.13
Similarly, the proper construction of the regulatory
requirement for nonitemization characterization that the
expense be incurred in the employee’s conduct of the
employer’s business is that the expense must have a
business benefit to the employer other than the benefit of
compensating the employee. A reasonable addition to

this construction is that the business purpose of the
employer must be the principal purpose of making the
payment.
In the Rodriguez case, what was the business benefit to
the University of Michigan? Michigan wished to employ
Rodriguez and could not do so unless he was freed of his
contractual relationship with West Virginia. To obtain
Rodriguez’s services, the buyout payment had to be
made. It was a common interest of both Rodriguez and
Michigan that he be released from his obligations to West
Virginia. Michigan’s payment was a cost of obtaining
Rodriguez. It was not a deductible expense of Michigan’s
because it was a capital expenditure. Since Michigan is a
tax-exempt entity, it does not matter to Michigan whether
it could deduct the payment. For purposes of verifying
the legitimacy of the expenditure, it does not matter that
it was a capital expenditure as to the university. What
matters is that the expenditure was made for a legitimate
noncompensatory business purpose of the university and
that the expense was deductible by Rodriguez under
section 162.
The fact that Rodriguez also benefited from the university’s payment does not alter the nonitemization
characterization of the deduction. There is no prohibition
against a business expense of an employer’s benefiting
the employee as well provided that the principal motive
for making the payment was not to compensate the
employee. For example, if an employee were to travel to
Paris on a business trip for his employer, the reimbursement of the travel expenses would provide nonitemization treatment for the expense even though the employee
greatly enjoyed his free time in Paris.
When an employee’s reimbursed business expense is a
nonitemized deduction, it effectively eliminates the income recognized by the employee from the receipt of the
reimbursement. Rather than require the employee to
report the income and offsetting deduction, which nets
out to zero, the regulations permit the employee in some
cases simply to exclude the reimbursement from income
and not claim a deduction for the payment, provided
certain conditions are met that ensure the expense will be
open to inspection by the Service if questions arise.14 That
regulation treats a direct payment of an employee’s
expense as a constructive payment by the employee
followed by a reimbursement from the employer.

B. The Employee Is an Incidental Beneficiary
If a taxpayer incurs an expense on behalf of another
person, whether or not employed by that other person, a
reimbursement to the taxpayer will not be included in the
taxpayer’s gross income even if the taxpayer also benefited from the expenditure. For example, while the
expenses of seeking employment in a business in which
the taxpayer was not previously engaged are not deductible, if the taxpayer is reimbursed for his expenses by the
prospective employer who invited the taxpayer to travel
to be interviewed, the reimbursement is not income to the

12

See Leandra Lederman, ‘‘Statutory Speed Bumps: The Role
Third Parties Play in Tax Compliance,’’ 60 Stanford L. Rev. 695
(2007).
13
Rev. Rul. 92-69, 1992-2 C.B. 51, 53.
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Reg. section 1.162-17(b).
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had a legitimate business purpose.12 Of course, not every
reimbursement will verify this. An employer could reimburse a nonbusiness expenditure of an employee as a
means of providing additional compensation for the
employee’s services. So, the statute requires that for
nonitemization to apply, the expense be incurred in
connection with services performed as an employee
under a reimbursement plan with his employer and that
the expense be deductible by the employee under one of
the provisions in sections 161 to 169. Reg. section 1.622(d) indicates that the employee must have provided the
services in his capacity as an employee of the person who
is reimbursing the cost. How strictly should that requirement be construed?
The third-party verification purpose of the requirement is satisfied if the employer has a legitimate business
purpose for paying the cost other than a purpose to
compensate the employee for his services. The reason for
the qualification requirement is to distinguish compensatory reimbursements from those that relate to costs that
served a business purpose of the employer. A reasonable
construction then is that the expenditure must provide a
significant business benefit to the employer other than
the benefit of compensating the employee, and that
business benefit must be the primary purpose of the
employer’s making the payment. That construction was
adopted by the Service in a similar context involving the
application of section 132(a)(3), (d), the working condition fringe benefit exclusion.
In Rev. Rul. 92-69, 1992-2 C.B. 51, the Service held that
expenses incurred and paid by an employer to assist
terminated employees to locate work were excluded
from the employee’s income by section 132(a)(3) as a
working condition fringe benefit. The ruling quoted from
the applicable regulation (reg. section 1.132-5(a)(2)(i))
that for the statutory exclusion to apply, the expense
must be ‘‘allowable as a deduction with respect to the
employee’s specific trade or business of being an employee of the employer.’’ The ruling then construed that
language as follows:
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Rev. Rul. 63-77, 1963-1 C.B. 177.
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their stock other than voting stock of the acquiring
corporation.16 The reorganization expenses incurred by
the shareholders of the target are their personal liability.
Those reorganization expenses can include legal and
accounting fees incurred by the shareholders provided
they are directly related to the reorganization. Incurring
those expenses benefits both the shareholders and the
acquiring corporation. Since those expenses are of mutual benefit to both the shareholders and the acquiring
corporation, the Service has ruled that the acquiring
corporation’s payment of those expenses does not constitute consideration paid to the target’s shareholders and
so does not prevent the exchange from qualifying for
nonrecognition treatment. Similarly, Michigan’s payment
of part of the buyout obligation should not be income to
Rodriguez since it was of a mutual benefit to both
Michigan and Rodriguez.

III. Conclusion
Michigan’s payment of a portion of the buyout that
Rodriguez owed to West Virginia should not cause
Rodriguez to incur income tax liability for two separate
reasons. First, because the constructive reimbursement to
Rodriguez should elevate the constructive payment Rodriguez made to West Virginia to the status of a nonitemized deduction, which would wash out any income he
recognized from the receipt of the constructive reimbursement. This second is that the payment constitutes a
noncompensatory payment for the business purpose of
Michigan (of which Rodriguez was merely an incidental
beneficiary).
While we have concluded that Rodriguez should not
incur tax liability, there is no certainty as to how this issue
will play out if litigated. We are convinced that the
proper result is to exonerate Rodriguez from tax liability,
but litigation does not always achieve the optimum
result.
The issues discussed here are much broader than the
specific problem faced by Rodriguez or the problem
faced by any new employee whose new employer reimburses or directly pays termination fees for the departure
from a prior job. These issues arise in numerous contexts.
It will be interesting to see how the issues are resolved.
One concern that the position urged by the authors in
this paper might raise is that it leaves open the possibility
that a new employer and employee might arrange for the
new employer to pay the new employee’s termination
fees in exchange for the new employee’s accepting a
reduced salary. It would be difficult to police that type of
collusion. But, unless and until it takes place, this problem can be left to the substance-over-form rules or
legislative restrictions. The requirement that the employer’s business purpose be the primary reason for
making the payment is a restriction that addresses this
problem. A legislative cure can address a specific abusive

16
Section 368(a)(1)(B). In the case of a so-called triangular B
reorganization, voting stock of a parent corporation of the
acquiring corporation can be used.
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taxpayer regardless of whether he is hired.15 The taxpayer clearly benefits from having the opportunity to
visit the firm. He has the opportunity to convince the
firm to employ him, and he has the opportunity to see
whether he would like to work there. But the firm’s
purpose in reimbursing the taxpayer is not to compensate him. Rather, it wants the opportunity to inteview the
taxpayer, and to convince him to accept an offer if after
the interview it is determined that there is a good fit. The
Service has agreed that the taxpayer does not have
income from the receipt of the reimbursement regardless
of whether the taxpayer secures a position with the firm.
Several revenue rulings shed light. In Rev. Rul. 66-41,
1966-1 C.B. 233, the taxpayer incurred a liability to pay an
employment agency a fee for locating a job that the
taxpayer accepted. The fee was a personal obligation of
the taxpayer. The new employer agreed that if the
taxpayer performed satisfactorily for a stated period of
time, the employer would reimburse the taxpayer for the
agency’s fee. The Service ruled that the employer’s
reimbursement was income to the taxpayer. The ruling
was subsequently distinguished in a ruling on similar
facts, but with an important difference.
In Rev. Rul. 73-351, 1973-2 C.B. 323, an employer
contracted with an employment agency to pay a fee for
any person it hired through the agency. The new employee did not have to pay the agency. The Service ruled
that employer’s payment of the fee was not income to an
employee who had been hired through the agency. The
Service noted that Rev. Rul. 66-41 was distinguishable
and inapplicable.
The difference between the facts of those two rulings is
instructive. In the 1973 ruling, the employer’s payment of
the fee was for the purpose of obtaining the services of
the taxpayer, but it was not given for services performed
by the taxpayer or to be performed in the future. This is
similar to the circumstance of Rodriguez. The fee in the
1973 ruling would have been a personal obligation of the
employee if the employer had not agreed to pay it, and
yet the payment was not income to the employee. The
payment was a business benefit to the employer, but also
benefited the employee.
In contrast, the fee paid in the 1966 ruling was paid
only after the employee performed services for the employer and the services were judged to be satisfactory.
Those facts indicate that the principal purpose of the
payment of the fee was to compensate the employee for
the satisfactory performance of services for the employer.
As additional compensation, it was proper to include the
payment in the employee’s income.
There is another example of a circumstance where a
taxpayer does not have income from another’s payment
even though the taxpayer benefits from it. This example
is drawn from corporate tax law. A B reorganization is an
acquisition of stock of a target corporation from its
shareholders in exchange for voting stock of the acquiring corporation. One of the requirements for obtaining
nonrecognition treatment for the exchange is that the
shareholders of the target receive no compensation for
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ployer’s reimbursement of travel expenses for a temporary employee. The Service and the courts have been able
to deal with those situations when they arise. The tax law
generally has chosen to deal with specific abuses separately rather than to inoculate against them by prohibiting the appropriate tax treatment of legitimate
transactions.
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situation that arises without preventing the proper treatment of payments that are not part of a disguised
compensation arrangement.
Moreover, the potential for parties to collude to disguise the true nature of a transaction is not unique to
reimbursements for buyout payments. It exists in many
circumstances including the current treatment of fringe
benefits for employees and the treatment of an em-

